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The first Soviet atomic bomb
The creation of the Soviet nuclear bomb in terms of the complexity of scientific, technical and engineering tasks is a significant, truly unique event that influenced the balance of political forces in the world after the Second World War.
The solution of this problem in our country, which has not yet recovered from the terrible destruction and upheavals of the four war years, became possible as a result of the heroic efforts of scientists, production organizers, engineers, workers and the entire people The implementation of the Soviet nuclear project required a real scientific, technological and industrial revolution, which led to the emergence of the domestic nuclear industry The implementation of the Soviet nuclear project required a real scientific, technological and industrial revolution, which led to the emergence of the domestic nuclear industry.
This labor feat has justified itself.
Having mastered the secrets of the production of nuclear weapons, our Motherland for many years ensured the military defense parity of the two leading states of the world – the USSR and the USA The nuclear shield, the first link of which was the legendary RDS 1 product, still protects Russia today.
I. Kurchatov was appointed the head of the Nuclear project Since the end of 1942, he began to gather scientists and specialists necessary to solve the problem.
Initially, the general management of the atomic problem was carried out by V. Molotov
But on August 20, 1945 (a few days after the atomic bombing of Japanese cities), the State Defense Committee decided to create a Special Committee headed by L. Beria.
It was he who became the head of the Soviet nuclear project.
The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS 1
It was deciphered in different ways: "Russia makes itself", "The Motherland gives Stalin", etc.
But in the official resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 21, 1946, the RDS received the wording - "Jet engine "With"".
The tactical and technical task (TTZ) indicated that the atomic bomb is being developed in two versions: with the use of "heavy fuel" (plutonium) and with the use of "light fuel" (uranium 235) The writing of the TOR on RDS 1 and the subsequent development of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS 1 was carried out taking into account the available materials according to the scheme of the US plutonium bomb tested in 1945 These materials were provided by the Soviet foreign intelligence service
An important source of information was K. Fuchs – a German physicist who participated in the work on the nuclear programs of the United States and England.
Intelligence materials on the US plutonium bomb made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes when creating the RDS 1, significantly reduce the time of its development, and reduce costs At the same time, it was clear from the very beginning that many technical solutions of the American prototype are not the best.
Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions for both the charge as a whole and its individual components But the absolute requirement of the country's leadership was to get a functioning bomb guaranteed and with the least risk by its first test.
A nuclear bomb should be made in the form of an aircraft bomb weighing no more than 5 tons, with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters and a length of no more than 5 meters.
These restrictions were due to the fact that the bomb was developed in relation to the TU 4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which allowed the placement of a "product" with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters.
As the work progressed, the need for a special research organization for the design and development of the "product" itself became obvious.
A number of studies conducted by the N2 Laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences required their deployment in a "remote and isolated place".
This meant that it was necessary to create a special research and production center for the development of an atomic bomb.
Since the end of 1945, there has been a search for a place to place a top secret object.
Various options were considered At the end of April 1946, Yu.
Khariton and P. Zernov visited Sarov, where the monastery used to be, and now the factory N 550 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition was located As a result, the choice was made on this place, which was remote from major cities and at the same time had an initial production infrastructure.
The scientific and production activities of KB 11 were subject to the strictest secrecy.
Its nature and goals were a State secret of paramount importance.
Its nature and goals were a State secret of paramount importance.
The issues of object protection have been in the center of attention since the first days.
The issues of object protection have been in the center of attention since the first days.
On April 9, 1946, a closed resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the creation of the Design Bureau (KB 11) at the Laboratory N 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences
P. Zernov was appointed head of KB 11, and Yu.
Chariton.
The resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 21, 1946 determined the strict deadlines for the creation of the object: the first stage was to enter service on October 1, 1946, the second - on May 1, 1947.
The construction of KB 11 ("object") was entrusted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.
The "object" was supposed to occupy up to 100 square kilometers of forests in the zone of the Mordovian Reserve and up to 10 square kilometers in the Gorky region.
The construction was carried out without projects and preliminary estimates, the cost of work was taken at actual costs.
The construction team was formed with the involvement of a" special contingent " - this was how the prisoners were designated in official documents.
The government created special conditions for providing construction.
Nevertheless, the construction was difficult, the first production buildings were ready only at the beginning of 1947 Some of the laboratories are located in the monastery buildings.
The volume of construction work was great The volume of construction work was great.
It was necessary to reconstruct the plant N 550 for the construction of a pilot plant on the existing areas It was necessary to reconstruct the plant N 550 for the construction of a pilot plant on the existing areas The power plant needed to be updated.
It was necessary to build a foundry and press shop for working with explosives, as well as a number of buildings for experimental laboratories, test towers, casemates, warehouses.
It was necessary to build a foundry and press shop for working with explosives, as well as a number of buildings for experimental laboratories, test towers, casemates, warehouses To carry out blasting operations, it was necessary to clear and equip large areas in the forest.
There were no special rooms for research laboratories at the initial stage – scientists had to occupy twenty rooms in the main design building.
The designers, as well as the administrative services of KB 11, had to be located in the reconstructed premises of the former monastery.
The designers, as well as the administrative services of KB 11, had to be located in the reconstructed premises of the former monastery.
The need to create conditions for arriving specialists and workers forced us to pay more and more attention to the residential settlement, which gradually acquired the features of a small city.
Simultaneously with the construction of housing, a medical campus was built, a library, a cinema club, a stadium, a park and a theater were built.
On February 17, 1947, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed by Stalin, KB 11 was classified as a special regime enterprise with the transformation of its territory into a closed regime zone.
Sarov was removed from the administrative subordination of the Mordovian ASSR and excluded from all accounting materials.
In the summer of 1947, the perimeter of the zone was taken under military protection.
Works in KB 11
The mobilization of specialists to the nuclear center was carried out regardless of their departmental affiliation.
The heads of KB 11 were searching for young and promising scientists, engineers, workers in literally all institutions and organizations of the country.
All candidates for a job in KB 11 passed a special check in the state security services.
The creation of atomic weapons was the result of the work of a large team.
But it consisted not of faceless "staff units", but of bright personalities, many of whom left a noticeable mark in the history of domestic and world science.
A significant potential was concentrated here, both scientific, design, and performing, working.
In 1947, 36 researchers came to work at KB 11.
They were seconded from various institutes, mainly from the USSR Academy of Sciences: the Institute of Chemical Physics, Laboratory N2, Research Institute 6 and the Institute of Machine Science.
In 1947, 86 engineering and technical workers worked in KB 11.
Taking into account the problems that had to be solved in KB 11, the order of formation of its main structural divisions was planned.
The first research laboratories began working in the spring of 1947 in the following areas: laboratory N1 (head - M. Y. Vasiliev) – testing of structural elements of the explosive charge that provide a spherically converging detonation wave; laboratory N2 (A. F. Belyaev) – studies of explosive detonation; laboratory N3 (V. A. Zukerman) – X – ray studies of explosive processes; laboratory N4 (L. V. Altshuler) - determination of equations of state; laboratory N5 (K. I. Shchelkin) - field tests; laboratory N6 (E. K. Zavoysky) – measurements of the compression of the central frequency; laboratory N7 (A. Ya. Apin) - development of a neutron fuse; laboratory N8 (N. V. Ageev) - study of the properties and characteristics of plutonium and uranium for use in the design of a bomb.
The beginning of full scale work of the first domestic atomic charge can be attributed to July 1946.
During this period, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 21, 1946, Yu.B. Khariton prepared a "Tactical and technical task for an atomic bomb".
The TTZ indicated that the atomic bomb is being developed in two versions.
In the first of them, the working substance should be plutonium (RDS 1), in the second – uranium 235 (RDS 2).
In a plutonium bomb, the transition through the critical state should be achieved by symmetrical compression of plutonium, which has the shape of a ball, with a conventional explosive (implosive version).
In the second variant, the transition through the critical state is provided by combining the masses of uranium 235 with an explosive ("cannon version").
At the beginning of 1947, the formation of design units began.
Initially, all design work was concentrated in the unified scientific and design sector (NCS) of KB 11, which was headed by V. A. Turbiner.
The intensity of work in KB 11 from the very beginning was very great and constantly increased, since the initial plans, which were very extensive from the very beginning, increased every day in terms of volume and depth of study.
Conducting explosive experiments with large explosive charges was started in the spring of 1947 at the experimental sites of KB 11 that were still under construction.
The largest amount of research was to be performed in the gas dynamic sector.
In this regard, a large number of specialists were sent there in 1947: K. I. Shchelkin, L. V. Altshuler, V. K. Bobolev, S. N. Matveev, V. M. Nekrutkin, P. I. Roy, N. D. Kazachenko, V. I. Zhuchikhin, A. T. Zavgorodny, K. K. Krupnikov, B. N. Ledenev, V. M. Malygin, V. M. Bezotosny, D. M. Tarasov, K. I. Panevkin, B. A. Terletskaya and others.
Experimental studies of the gas dynamics of the charge were conducted under the direction of K. I. Shchelkin, and theoretical issues were developed by a group located in Moscow, headed by Ya.B. Zeldovich.
The work was carried out in close cooperation with designers and technologists.
A. Ya.
Apin, V. A. Alexandrovich and designer A. I. Abramov were engaged in the development of the "NZ" (neutron fuse).
To achieve the desired result, it was necessary to master a new technology for using polonium, which has a sufficiently high radioactivity.
At the same time, it was necessary to develop a complex system for protecting materials in contact with polonium from its alpha radiation.
For a long time, research and design work on the most precise element of the detonator capsule charge was carried out in KB 11.
This important direction was led by A. Ya.
Apin, I. P. Sukhov, M. I. Puzyrev, I. P. Kolesov and others.
The development of research required the territorial approach of theoretical physicists to the research, design and production base of KB 11.
Since March 1948, a theoretical department under the leadership of Ya.
B. Zeldovich began to form in KB 11.
Due to the great urgency and high complexity of the work, new laboratories and production sites began to be created in KB 11, and the best specialists of the Soviet Union who were seconded to them mastered new high standards and strict production conditions.
The plans drawn up in 1946 could not take into account many of the difficulties that the participants of the atomic project were discovering as they moved forward.
Resolution CM N 234-98 SS/op from 08.02.1948 G. production Time charge RDS 1 was related to a later date to the date of readiness of the details of the charge of the plutonium Plant N 817.
Regarding option 2 RDS by this time it had become clear that it is inappropriate to bring to the testing stage due to the relatively low efficiency of this variant compared to the cost of nuclear materials.
Work on RDS 2 was stopped in mid 1948.
According to the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 10, 1948, they were appointed: first deputy chief designer of the "object" - Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin; deputy chief designer of the object - Vladimir Ivanovich Alferov, Nikolai Leonidovich Dukhov.
In February 1948, 11 scientific laboratories were working hard at KB 11, including theorists under the leadership of Ya.
B. Zeldovich, who had moved to the facility from Moscow.
His group included D. D. Frank Kamenetsky, N. D. Dmitriev, V. Yu.
Gavrilov.
The experimenters did not lag behind the theorists.
The most important work was carried out in the departments of KB 11, which were responsible for detonating a nuclear charge.
Its design was clear, the mechanism of detonation was also clear.
In theory.
In practice, it was necessary to carry out checks again and again, to carry out complex experiments.
Production workers also worked very actively - those who had to translate the ideas of scientists and designers into reality.
In July 1947, A. K. Bessarabenko was appointed the head of the plant, N. A. Petrov became the chief engineer, P. D. Panasyuk, V. D. Shcheglov, A. I. Novitsky, G. A. Savosin, A. Ya.
Ignatiev, V. S. Lyubertsev became the heads of the workshops .
In 1947, a second experimental plant appeared in the structure of KB 11 - for the production of parts from explosives, the assembly of experimental components of the product and the solution of many other important tasks.
The results of calculations and design studies were quickly translated into concrete parts, nodes, blocks.
This, by the highest standards, responsible work was performed by two plants at KB 11.
The plant N 1 carried out the manufacture of many parts and assemblies of RDS 1 and then their assembly.
Plant No. 2 (A. Ya.
Malsky became its director) was engaged in the practical solution of various tasks related to the production and processing of parts from explosives.
The assembly of the explosive charge was carried out in the workshop, which was headed by M. A. Kvasov.
Each completed stage set new tasks for researchers, designers, engineers, and workers.
People worked 14-16 hours a day, giving themselves completely to the cause.
On August 5, 1949, a charge of plutonium made at the Plant N 817 was accepted by a commission headed by Khariton and then sent by letter train to KB 11.
Here, on the night of August 10 to 11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out.
She showed: RDS 1 meets the technical requirements, the product is suitable for testing at the landfill.
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